崛起与陨落，中俄命运为何走向歧路？编辑本段回目录
中俄两国的历史都揭露了一点：由政治主导和国家控制的企业是没有竞争力的。由于俄罗斯当前的领导层对工业经济控制的加深，国家问题越来越严重。俄罗斯的这些新国有企业所面临的竞争很少，或是没有竞争。俄罗斯的新领导层将外资企业赶出国门，而私营企业家一旦踏足国有企业的市场，将受到人身伤害的威胁。俄罗斯的巨头企业们(俄罗斯天然气工业公司，卢克石油公司，俄罗斯石油公司等可能会经营效率越来越低，逐渐变成政治主导而非经济收益主导型企业。
崛起与陨落，中俄命运为何走向歧路
By Paul R. Gregory and Kate Zhou
作者：保罗·格雷戈里、凯特·周
Two dissimilar economic paths
两条迥异的经济路线
On a dark November night in 1978, 18 Chinese peasants from Xiaogang village in Anhui province secretly divided communal land to be farmed by individual families, who would keep what was left over after meeting state quotas. Such a division was illegal and highly dangerous, but the peasants felt the risks were worth it. The timing is significant for our story. The peasants took action one month before the “reform” congress of the party was announced. Thus, without fanfare, began economic reform, as spontaneous land division spread to other villages. One farmer said, “When one family’s chicken catches the pest, the whole village catches it. When one village has it, the whole county will be infected.”
在1978年11月一个漆黑的夜晚，安徽小岗村的18名村民偷偷地对集体所有的土地实行了包产到户，也就是在交纳国家公粮之后，剩余的粮食归个人所有。这种做法不仅违法，而且极度危险，但他们觉得冒这个险是值得的。在我们的故事中，时机的含义总是意味深长。小岗村的包产到户发生在全国人大宣布“改革”之前的一个月。因此，改革在没有大规模宣传的背景下，已悄然揭开序幕。与此同时，自发的包产到户犹如星星之火，延烧到别的村庄。曾经有一位农民说过，“如果一家人的小鸡捉到了虫子，那么整个村子的小鸡也能捉到虫子。如果一个村子行动起来，全国的村子就会被影响到。”2
Ten years later, in August of 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev lifted his nation’s 50-year-old prohibition against private farming, offering 50-year leases to farm families who would subsequently work off of contracts with the state. Few accepted the offer; Russian farmers were too accustomed to the dreary but steady life on the state or collective farm. Thus began reform of agriculture in Soviet Russia.
10年之后的1988年8月，米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫（Mikhail Gorbachev）打破了前苏联对私人农业长达50年的禁令，为愿意和政府签订合同的农民提供了50年的租约。很少有农民接受这个合同，他们已经习惯了在政府或集体所有的土地上进行沉闷而稳定的生活。这是苏联农业改革的开端。
The results in each country could not have been more different. Chronically depressed Chinese agriculture began to blossom, not only for grain but for all crops. As farmers brought their crops to the city by bicycle or bus, long food lines began to dwindle and then disappear. The state grocery monopoly ended in less than one year. Soviet Russian agriculture continued to stagnate despite massive state subsidies. Citizens of a superpower again had to bear the indignity of sugar rations.
两国改革的效果有云泥之别。长期萧条的中国农业开始繁荣，不仅仅是谷物，所有的作物都获得了丰收。农民用自行车或汽车把粮食贩卖到城市，排队买粮的城里人慢慢减少，最后完全消失。国有供销社不到一年就完全消亡。而反观苏联的农业，尽管国家投入了大把补贴，但仍然处于半死不活的状态。超级大国的公民不得不又一次忍受食糖定量供应的羞辱。
These two examples point to the proper narrative of reform in Gorbachev’s Russia and Deng Xiaoping’s China. Our narrative contradicts much received doctrine. The standard account is that China succeeded because a wise party leadership deliberately chose gradualism, retained the monopoly of the Communist Party after rebuffing democracy at Tiananmen Square, and carefully guided the process over the years. The narrative says that Russia failed because the tempestuous Gorbachev ignored the Chinese reform model, moved too quickly, and allowed the party monopoly to fall apart. This standard account is incorrect. Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, contrary to popular legend, did not agree on a reform program at the Third Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress in 1978, which installed him in power. A Chinese reform official by the name of Bao Tong later admitted as much: “In fact, reform wasn’t discussed. Reform wasn’t listed on the agenda, nor was it mentioned in the work reports.”
这两个例子分别说明了戈尔巴乔夫的苏联和邓小平的中国的改革现状。我们的叙述和固有的说法大不相同。按照官方说法，中国的成功是因为充满智慧的政党深思熟虑地选择了渐进式的改革，并巩固了党的绝对领导，另外还对改革过程进行了细致的引导。苏联失败的原因是急躁的戈尔巴乔夫忽略了中国模式，动作太快，没有保证党的绝对领导。这种说法是错误的。十一届三中全会奠定了邓小平的领导权，但他和他的支持者实际上根本就不支持改革。后来一位名为鲍彤(Bao Tong)的官员也承认：“实际上，我们没有讨论改革。改革没有出现在会议的日程上，政府工作报告也没有提及它。”
Throughout the reform process, the Chinese Communist Party simply reacted to (and wisely did not oppose) bottom-up reform initiatives that emanated largely from the rural population. Deng Xiaoping’s famous description of Chinese reform as “fording the river by feeling for the stones” is not incorrect, but it was the Chinese people who placed the stones under his feet.
纵观整个改革，中国共产党只是顺应了（很明智地没有反对）自下而上的改革要求，这种要求主要来自于农民。邓小平对把中国改革描述成“摸着石头过河”，这其实并不正确。实际上是中国人民把石头放到了他脚下。2
Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of his party in March of 1985. By that time, he knew that the Chinese reforms were successful. His reforms, contrary to the popular narrative, closely mimicked China’s. He proposed to lease land to peasants, establish free trade zones, promote small cooperative businesses, and set up joint ventures. The difference was that Gorbachev imposed these changes from above, on an urban economy in which virtually all citizens worked for the state. Gorbachev’s reforms either were ignored or they were enacted with perverse consequences. Bottom-up reforms worked in China; top-down reforms failed in Russia.
米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫在1985年3月成了苏联共产党的总书记。那时，他知道中国的改革是成功的。和大家的共同看法不同的是，戈尔巴乔夫的改革其实是在模仿中国。他建议把土地租给农民、创建自由贸易区、促进小型合作企业并且建立联合投资。所不同的是，戈尔巴乔夫的改革是自上而下的，改革的对象实际上是所有公民都为国家工作的城市经济。戈尔巴乔夫的改革要么被忽略，要么走回头路。自下而上的改革在中国取得了成功，自上而下的改革在苏联遭遇了失败。
Both countries began serious reform after the passing of a leader (or leadership) that abhorred reform. Deng Xiaoping and his allies succeeded Mao in 1978 after a brief power struggle with hardliners. Gorbachev succeeded the initial beneficiaries of Stalin’s purges of the 1930s, who rose quickly as young men to replace those who were executed. The forgettable Konstantin Chernenko was the last in line; there was no choice but to turn to a relative newcomer when he died. For Gorbachev, the horrors of the Stalin era were in the distant past. For Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, the excesses of Mao — the starvation of the Great Leap and the “reeducations” of the Cultural Revolution — were recent and personal experiences. Whereas Stalin had physically annihilated independent-minded party officials, Mao permitted them to survive, subsequently to take over after he was gone. Gorbachev worked his way up the party ladder as a typical apparatchik; although touted as a reformer, he had few reform ideas. His Politburo and Central Committee comrades had no real stomach for reform. Deng Xiaoping also had not worked out a reform program, but he knew enough not to oppose reforms that work (“I don’t care if it is a black or yellow cat as long as it catches mice”).
两个国家真正改革都发生在厌恶改革的旧领导人移交权力之后。邓小平和他的盟友在1978年同强硬派经过短暂的权力斗争之后，从毛泽东手中接过了政权。戈尔巴乔夫是斯大林30年代大清洗之后的受益人。随着年轻人顶替那些被处决的官员，他的职位上升得很快。被人所遗忘的康斯坦因·契尔年科（Konstantin Chernenko）是最后一届领导人。他死后，政权最终落在年轻人手里。对于戈尔巴乔夫来说，斯大林时代的恐惧已经成为遥远的过去。对于邓小平和他的支持者来说，毛泽东时期大跃进的饥荒和文化大革命“再教育”的伤痛不仅时间比较接近，而且也有切身感受。斯大林从肉体上消灭了有独立思想的官员，而毛泽东留下了他们。这些人在毛泽东死后接管了政权。戈尔巴乔夫像一个典型的苏联共产党官员那样爬上了权力的顶峰，尽管作为改革者极力宣扬改革，但他基本没有改革的理想。苏联政治局和中央委员会也没有真正的能力应对改革。邓小平也没有描绘出改革的蓝图，但是他清楚地知道不要反对有用的改革（“不管是黑猫黄猫，能抓到老鼠的就是好猫”）。
Real reforms, whether dictated from the top or bubbling up from below, require a reform constituency. In the Chinese case, a large percentage of the population was recovering from the catastrophes of the Mao years. Rural dwellers, in particular, had witnessed the chaos of the Great Leap and had seen their parents and children die from starvation during the 1958–61 famine. They learned they had to take care of themselves. The urban elite had been ripped from the cities to a life of work and reeducation in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, and a whole generation had been deprived of schooling. In the Russian case, the last famine lay three decades in the past. After the war, few people were executed for political crimes (political dissent became instead a mental disorder); the Gulag had been gradually dismantled after Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech of 1956. All lived under the motto, “We pretend to work and you pretend to pay.” Surveys show that Russians were basically content with the system, comfortable in the bosom of their state enterprise or state farm. China had a reform constituency; Russia did not. Gorbachev had few reform-minded aides. He listened to the bad advice of his economists. He was opposed by an entrenched bureaucracy but supported by enterprise managers eager to cash in on ill-conceived reform.
真正的改革，不管是自下而上还是自上而下，都需要改革的支持者。在中国，大部分人刚刚经历了毛泽东时代的灾难，尤其是农民，他们亲身经历了大跃进时代的混乱，并眼睁睁看着自己的父母和儿女在1958~1961年间的大饥荒中死去。他们知道要好好照顾自己。文化大革命期间，城市精英被从城市赶到农村接受再教育，整整一代人被剥夺了受教育的权利。在苏联，上一次饥荒发生在30年之前。二战之后，基本没有人因为政治犯罪而被处决（政治异端被精神不正常所代替）。赫鲁晓夫1956年发表了秘密讲话之后，古拉格被逐渐拆除。所有人都坚持同一个信条：“我假装工作，国家假装付薪水。”调查显示苏联人基本满意这种体制，在国有企业和农场中得过且过。中国有改革的支持者，苏联没有。戈尔巴乔夫基本没有拥有改革思想的帮手。他听从了经济学家的错误建议。根深蒂固的官僚体制反对他，但是想在错误的改革中捞取好处的企业老板支持他。
Agriculture
农业
Both chinese and Soviet Russian agriculture were collectivized by force. In Russia, the forced collectivization and dekulakization campaigns of 1929–31 set off a civil war in the countryside that was brutally repressed. The more prosperous farm families were either imprisoned or exiled, leaving behind dispirited peasants herded into collective farms strictly controlled by rural political bureaus and machine tractor stations. Agriculture had to dance to Moscow’s tune. In China, the land was first taken away from land owners between 1950 and 1953 following rural purges that cost between 2 million and 5 million lives. The land reform distributed plots to farmers for use but not ownership, despite resistance of the peasantry. Between 1950 and 1951 alone, 712,000 people were executed, 1,290,000 imprisoned, and 1,200,000 sent to labor camps.
中国和前苏联的农业都是强制集体经营化模式。强制集体化和1929至1931年间的苏维埃运动引爆苏联农村内战，并被残酷镇压。资产丰厚的农耕家族要么锒铛入狱，要么流亡海外，留下无可奈何的普通农民成为农机站严格管制下的俘虏，被赶进集体农场。农业必须踏准莫斯科的节拍。在1950至1953年中国土改运动中，农民第一次被迫与自己的土地分离，200万到500万人为此付出生命的代价。尽管农民阶级奋起反抗，仍没改变他们失去土地所有权的事实，重新被划分成小块的土地仅供农民租用。单单在1950年至1951一年里，71.2万人伏法，129万人入狱，120万人被送进劳改所接受改造。3
Despite observing the catastrophe of Russian collectivization, Mao forced his peasants into huge communes starting in 1958. All property, sometimes including furniture and even knives and forks, became communal. In both cases, collective farms had to deliver farm products to the state at the very low prices it dictated. They had to obey harebrained directives from Moscow or Beijing, such as massive switching to corn, planting grain on land suited for fruits, or halting the production of “decadent” tea. Although intermittent efforts were made to suppress private plots in both countries, private plots kept farm families alive and provided some meat and dairy products, fruits and vegetables, to the cities, which were peddled by peasants on street corners.
尽管有苏联集体化灾难的前车之鉴，毛主席依然推行始于1958年的农民工社大改造运动。所有财产，还有家具甚至小到刀具都归集体所有。两国均规定，集体农场必须以极其低廉的价格向国家上交农作物。他们不得不服从来自莫斯科或者北京的轻率指令，譬如说跟风在本适宜种植水果的土地上大面积种植玉米和粮食，停止种植“堕落的”的茶叶。尽管两国一直以来都在抑制自留地，但正是这些自留地维持着农耕家族的生命力并提供一些肉类、乳制品、水果和蔬菜，供小商小贩沿街叫卖。
Both Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev inherited nonproductive collective agricultures. Soviet Russia’s farm sector had sunk to such depths that a traditional grain exporter was now importing grain from Australia and America. By Gorbachev’s time, the farm population had shrunk to a quarter of its former size; only older workers remained, working perfunctorily on state land or tending their private plots. They had long been converted into wage workers and received pensions and socialized medical care, albeit of a low quality. In China, rural dwellers accounted for 80 percent of the population; compared to Russian farmers they were young and vibrant. They lived without the social guarantees of Russian farmers. In China, only the young had not experienced private agriculture. Small private plots had existed in China for 2,000 years. An elderly farmer in Jingshan village succinctly captured this historical memory: “Family farming is as natural as human desire to eat, to have sex, and to love grandchildren. We loved family farming because it gave us some freedom. The leaders thought they knew better how to live our lives. But it is our lives, isn’t it?” In Russia, few farm dwellers could even remember the last experiment with private agriculture in the 1920s.
邓小平和戈尔巴乔夫均继承对生产毫无作用的集体式农业模式。前苏联的农业从一个传统粮食出口国沦落为现在依靠从澳大利亚和美国进口粮食。在戈尔巴乔夫时期，务农人口数量降至前一时期的四分之一。只有老农们继续劳作，在国有土地上敷衍行事，维护着他们的自留地。他们逐渐转为雇佣工人，领取养老金和社会化医疗保健，尽管条件很差。在中国，农村居民占全国人口80%，与俄罗斯农民相比，中国农民更加年轻，更具活力。他们生活在俄罗斯农民的社保范围之外。在中国，只有年轻农民未曾经历过私有制农业。小面积自留地在中国存在了2000年。景山村一位老农简短地回忆了那段时光：“家族农耕就像食色本性、抚育后代一样自然。家族农耕很自由，我们喜欢。领导们自认为比我们更懂如何过我们的生活，但这是我的生活啊，不是吗？”在俄罗斯，已经很少有农民能够回忆起20世纪20年代私有制农业的光景了。
The deal that Gorbachev offered his farmers in 1988 was that they could have their own plots of land with 50-year leases from the state. His offer was a “contracting system” whereby land leasers would deliver quotas to the state but could keep what was left over. He had virtually no takers. Russian farmers were embedded in state agriculture, from which they could “take” seed, fertilizer, and tools under the principle “they belong to everyone and hence to no one.” Chinese farmers were not made such a generous offer. Instead they began to quietly distribute the land, with each family delivering production for the state quota. Gorbachev called for decollectivization from above; China’s farmers decollectivized spontaneously from below. They created their own “contract responsibility system,” initially at risk of severe punishment. There were no leaders; there were no face-to-face confrontations. It just happened. As agricultural production soared, Deng Xiaoping and his party realized they could not resist and could take advantage of something that was working. By 1982, more than 90 percent of rural dwellers were engaged in the household production system. Even after Deng Xiaoping officially supported grassroots rural reform, he did not give farmers long-term commitments, as did Gorbachev. Farmers were given one- to three-year contracts in 1982. It was only in 2003 that the state gave long-term leases in its Rural Land Contracting Law.
1988年戈尔巴乔夫颁布的法令中规定，俄罗斯农民可以从国家租借自留地，期限为50年。他的法令即为土地承包制，承租人向国家上缴定额粮食，剩余部分归己所有。事实上，承租人并非收受者。俄罗斯农民深深依赖与国有农业，在遵守规则的前提下，可以从国家那里获取种子、肥料和工具，在这种原则下，“土地属于每一个人，因而也没一个人拥有土地”。中国农民可没他们那么有福气。中国则闷不做声地分配土地，每家每户向国家上缴公粮。戈尔巴乔夫要求的去集体化是从上层而来的。而中国农民去集体化是从底层自发的。最初，冒着巨大受罚风险，他们自发采取“承包责任制”的模式。这里没有领导，没有面对面的斡旋，它就这样发生了。随着农产量骤然攀升，以邓小平为中心的党中央意识到他们不能固步自封，应该从现实出发，汲取经验。到1982年，已有90%的农村居民加入到家庭生产承包责任制中。尽管邓小平正式宣布支持农民自发的改革，但如同戈尔巴乔夫，他未能给农民一个长久的许诺。1982年，农民拥有一到三年的合同期。直到2003年，中国政府才在《农村土地合同法》中明确将长期租赁期限合法化。
Entrepreneurs
企业家
The spontaneous creation of an agricultural contract system meant new supplies of agricultural products that needed to make their way to a market that still had to be created. Again Russia’s and China’s paths diverged in the reform of trade.
自发形成的农村土地承包责任制意味着农产品走向市场的新供应方式，再一次，俄罗斯与中国在贸易改革中分道扬镳。
At the time Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev came to power, domestic trade was dominated by state trading networks. Russia had largely outgrown rationing, although Russians had to stand in line for specific products, particularly alcohol. There existed a small “nonstate” trade network. Farmers were allowed to sell products from their private plots, and a thriving “second economy” provided goods and services that the planned economy did not. Because they operated in the shadows, it is difficult to compare respective magnitudes, but we do know that Russia’s shadow economy was well-developed. If Russian citizens wanted an experienced doctor, a car repaired, or color television, they turned to the black market. China was even more lacking in markets. Consumers received coupons for different types of goods and stood in long lines for each rationed product. In Wuhan, Hubei Province (where one of us lived for 30 years), there were more than 80 types of ration coupons for items like soap, cooking oil, meat, eggs, fish, tofu, grain, watches, bikes, furniture, and matches. At least in Russia, consumers could buy without coupons; the price was standing in line or getting scarce goods through “connections.”
在邓小平和戈尔巴乔夫执政时期，国家贸易被中央贸易商业网络所垄断。尽管 俄罗斯在诸如酒精等特殊物品上严重资源短缺，但仍旧超量配给。俄罗斯有一个非官方贸易网络。农民可以售卖自留地的农作物，繁荣了计划经济无法 提供的产品和服务，这被称之为“第二经济”。因为这不在明面上操作，我们很难比较两种经济形势的等级规模，不过我们知道俄罗斯的影子经济发展健全。若俄罗斯人要找一位经验丰富的医生、或者想修车，抑或购买彩色电视，他们会去黑市 上探寻目标。中国则更缺乏市场。消费者手持各种不同的配给券，排着队等候购买定额发放品。在湖北省武汉市（作者之一曾 在此生活长达30年），像肥皂、食用油、肉、蛋、鱼、豆腐、粮食、手表、自行车、家具和火柴都有专门的购买券，共有80多种。至少在俄国，人们不用拿着配 给券买东西，明码标价，价位统一，若有紧俏商品需求，他们靠走走关系获取。
Gorbachev, dissatisfied with the status quo, initiated reforms to expand markets and private trade. His reform failed. Deng Xiaoping was presented with an unsanctioned market by Chinese traders as a fait accompli. All he had to do was legalize it after its success was obvious. With millions of farmers selling, competition drove prices down to reasonable levels for urban consumers.
不满现状的戈尔巴乔夫，发起扩大市场鼓励私人贸易的改革，以失败告终。邓小平面临的是中国贸易商在未获批准的市场从事贸易行为的既定事实。他所能做的就是目睹这一市场的成功运作后将其合法化。由于数以百万的农民进行销售竞争，促使价格回归理性，城市消费者可以承受。
At the time Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev came to power, domestic trade was dominated by state trading networks.
在邓小平和戈尔巴乔夫执政时期，国家贸易被中央贸易商业网络所垄断。
Gorbachev saw Russia’s shadow economy as an asset he could build upon. His May 1987 Law on Cooperatives was designed to legalize many activities that had been illegal. The new cooperatives could use property and own equipment, and they could sell at market prices; the main restriction was that they could not employ hired labor. The first “New Russian” wealth was, in fact, a product of the cooperatives.
戈尔巴乔夫看到俄罗斯的影子经济是其可以用来创建的一种财富。 1987年5月，他颁布了“合作社法”，目的是用来使那些过去非法活动合法化。 新的合作社可以使用财产，拥有设备，并可以以市价出售商品；主要的限制就是合作社不能雇佣劳力。 事实上，第一批“新俄罗斯”财富正是合作社的一个产物。
Gorbachev hoped that the cooperatives would be the source of entrepreneurship. Following the May 1987 decree, cooperatives formed right and left, many within state enterprises, others under the auspices of social organizations. The cooperative law indeed brought the shadow economy out into the open. Its unanticipated consequence, however, was that cooperators added little to consumer welfare. Instead, they took advantage of loopholes offered by the planned economy to redistribute profits from the state sector into their own pockets. Cooperatives were formed within state enterprises under the guise of “small business”; they commandeered materials from state enterprises at low prices and then sold the output at high “cooperative” prices. They used influence to buy and then resell scarce foreign goods by bribing trade officials. A typical cooperator was a former kgb officer (known to one of us), who used his connections to buy personal computers at low prices from a state trading company and then resold them to consumers, all under the “roof” of the Academy of Sciences. He went on to become a respected deputy in parliament. Like this former kgb officer, the New Russians, spawned by cooperative laws, provided Russians with their first bitter taste of “capitalism,” which Russians subsequently associated with illicit gains (and still do to this day).
戈尔巴乔夫希望合作社能成为企业家精神的源泉。1987年5月法律颁布之后，合作社到处都是，很多还是成立在国有企业里边， 另外一部分是由社会团体主办。合作社法确实把影子经济引向到了公开的层面。然而，没有预料到的结果是合作社的经营者对于消费者利益考虑甚少。 相反，他们肆意利用计划经济的漏洞，把国有部门的利润转移到自己的口袋。 在国有企业内部，合作社披上“小型业务”的伪装；他们从国有企业中以低价强行获得各种资源材料，然后以“合作社”的价格卖掉生产的产品。 通过行贿商务官员，他们在买卖国外稀缺的货物方面不断施加影响。 一个典型的合作社成员就是前克格勃官员（有人知道此人为谁），他利用其关系从一家国有贸易公司低价买入一批个人用电脑，然后卖给客户，所有这一切都是以“社科院”的“名义”进行的。 后来他成为了议会中受人尊敬的一位代表。 就像这位前克格勃官员一样，“新型俄罗斯人”都是从合作社法中孵化而出的，给俄罗斯人民带来了第一批“资本主义”的苦涩之味，俄罗斯人从此也和非法获益联系在了一起（至今仍是如此）。
Another stark contrast should be emphasized: The Russian “entrepreneurs” of the cooperative movement were primarily city dwellers. Russian farmers, who rejected Gorbachev’s agricultural reforms, were not players. They did not produce goods that needed to be transported and marketed. China’s first entrepreneurs hailed primarily from the countryside, and they got their start by marketing farm products in the cities.
中俄之间另一个无法忽视的强烈反差是：俄罗斯合作社的“企业家”主要是城市居民，抵制戈尔巴乔夫进行农业改革的俄罗斯农民们并没有参与其中。而中国的首批企业家则主要来自乡村，他们是以在城市销售农产品起家的。
Private trade developed in China at the grassroots level, emerging from rural regions and prospering because it filled a vital need. The rural contract responsibility system created huge agricultural surpluses which had to be marketed outside the state system. Farm products had to be moved over long distances, either directly or through intermediaries — in violation of laws and without contracts that could be enforced in courts. A herculean task. But it was done by the tens and then hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs pushing the frontier of what was allowed. In effect, Chinese farmer-trader-entrepreneurs had to create completely new institutions for transporting and selling agricultural products. Once in place, they could be used to do the same for other goods and services. These initial entrepreneurs were not beneficiaries of state reform. Instead, they had to find ways to destroy socialist institutional barriers and create markets. The Chinese entrepreneur had to juggle profits and security. For most, a mistake meant confiscation, a jail sentence, or worse. The entrepreneur, operating in the grey area of legality, had no access to state capital. The state banks refused to serve any private businesses until June of 1988 and even then with tight restrictions.
私营经济是从中国的基层发展起来的，之所以在农村发展兴旺，是由于巨大的需求所致。农村联产承包责任制带来了大量超出国家计划收购数量内的农产品。农产品必须直接或通过中介来长途运输（这类运输往往违法，也缺少能呈上法庭的合同）。虽然任务艰巨，但数以万计的企业家不惜以此来拓宽法律所允许的界限。实际上，中国的农民-商人-企业家不得不创造出农产品运输和销售的全新营销服务模式。一旦有了成熟的模式，其他商品和服务也可以依此模式运营。这些最初积极变革的企业家不是国家改革的受益者。相反，他们必须设法摧毁社会主义体制的障碍，并开辟市场。当时的中国企业家需要颠覆私营利润和公有所得的概念。对大多数人来说，走错一步就得面对资产没收、被判拘禁，甚至更糟糕的结局。当时的企业家游离于体制之外的灰色地带，他们无法获取国有资本。国有银行在1988年6月前一直拒绝向任何私营业主提供资金。后来虽然同意，也仍对申请者进行严格审查。
China’s early trader-entrepreneurs had to first overcome the problem of distance between producers and consumers. Since the late 1940s, the state regarded long-distance trade as a speculative, capitalist activity and branded those involved as criminals. In the early 1960s, such traders were labeled as “bad elements.” Some lost their jobs or were sent to labor camps while others were put on neighborhood watch lists to be supervised closely. Even in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the sight of policemen chasing and confiscating a rural peddler’s goods was common. One Chinese entrepreneur compared his early business ventures to an untrained acrobat walking a tightrope: “I was excited about the huge market opportunities while scared to death of returning to a prison cell. I lived a life of constant sweat, sleepless nights, and thumping heartbeats.” Throughout the early 1980s, farmers in north Jiangsu packed their bikes with chickens, ducks, and other fowl, crossed the Yangzi River, and shipped their products by rail to urban centers in the Yangzi basin. “A million roosters cross the mighty Yangzi” was the expression of the day. By 1983, the majority of consumers in major cities purchased their products in free markets rather than in government stores. Within one year (between 1979 and 1980), most state vegetable markets, except the highly subsidized Beijing and Shanghai markets, were out of business.
中国早期的商人-企业家首先要解决的是生产者和消费者之间的距离问题。 自20世纪年40年代后期起，中国把长途贸易视为一项具有投机性质的资本主义活动，并将与之有关的行为定性为犯罪。在60年代初，这些商人被打成“资产阶级反动派。”有些失去了工作或者被送往劳改所进行改造，还有些被列入邻里监督名单，受到严密监视。即使在70年代末和80年代初，警察监管农村治安时一旦发现有私下交易买卖就立即没收商品也是非常常见的。一位中国企业家将其早期创业比作未经训练的杂技演员走钢索：“我非常高兴看到巨大的市场前景，但又极度担心会回到过去受监禁的日子。我靠不断付出自身劳动而生活，彻夜无眠，极度惊慌。”纵观整个20世纪80年代初期，江苏北部的农民用自行车载满鸡、鸭及其他家禽，渡过长江，再由火车将产品运到长江流域各地区。 “百万雄鸡过长江”可以用于形容这一场景。到1983年，主要城市里的大部分消费者已经可以从自由市场上，而不是国营商店里买到自己所需的商品。从1979年到1980年的这一年内，除受到高额补贴的北京和上海供给市场外，大多数国营蔬菜市场都停止经营了。
Most of China’s early entrepreneurs had farming backgrounds or, at a minimum, were from farm families.
中国早期的企业家大都做过农民，至少，是来自农村家庭。
The creation of a vast market in farm products was only the start. Once one institution was created, others had to follow. Private traders operated without permission to travel and could not stay in state-run hotels. Thus, entrepreneurs developed a network of private hotels. Remarkable stories of hardy entrepreneurs providing goods and services not available from the state economy abound: A rural minority woman from Hunan began her business by buying shoes in major cities and selling them in her hometown, Baojing. She had to leave her three children behind during her one- or two-month journeys. She lived frugally and invested in building new houses. When returning from her mountain sales trips, she bought herbs, mushrooms and other local goods and resold them in county markets. After a decade of hard work and helping her children get college degrees, she settled down and collected rent every month from the six houses she had built over the years. She is one of the nouveau riche in her hometown.
大型农产品市场的建立只是经济变革的开始。一旦在某一行业形成了一套模式，其他行业就会纷纷跟风模仿。由于法律禁止私人交易商搞长途贸易，而他们又无法入住国营宾馆，所以他们干脆建起了一个私营酒店网络。大批吃苦耐劳的企业家涌现出来，他们提供国有经济所没有的商品与服务，抒写了不少精彩故事：一个来自湖南农村的少数民族妇女开始在各大城市购买鞋子，然后再销往她的家乡——保靖。外出工作一走就一两个月，她不得不把三个孩子扔在家里。平日省吃俭用的她拿省下的钱建了房子。当她沿山路返回家乡时，会再买些药材、蘑菇和其他土特产拿到县里销售。经过十年的辛勤劳作，并供自己的孩子念完大学后，她终于安定了下来，每月从之前所建的六套房子收取月租。她是当地的暴发户之一。
Most of China’s early entrepreneurs had farming backgrounds or, at a minimum, were from farm families. The richest Chinese citizen in 2007 was the daughter of a poor farmer from the southern province of Guangdong, whose family became wealthy after acquiring large tracts of land and distressed assets in the countryside, where there was no real estate business, in the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, her father developed affordable townhouses and holiday homes for China’s growing middle class. Other rural entrepreneurs did not make their way into a top ten list, but their success stories are equally striking. After their release from the communes in the early 1980s, rural entrepreneurs left their villages to establish restaurants, laundries, and small manufacturing businesses in major cities. Friends and relatives followed, as explained by a Wenzhou entrepreneur: “My neighbor set up a small laundry shop in Shanghai and made some money. My brothers and I borrowed 80,000 Yuan from relatives and friends, plus our 21,000 Yuan in family savings. When we went to Shanghai in 1995, we found out that there were already too many shops of this kind. This is why we turned to dry cleaning.” Like entrepreneurs elsewhere, Chinese private entrepreneurs set up their businesses through the three Fs (friends, family, and fools).
中国早期的企业家大多都有务农的背景，或者至少是来自农业家庭。2007年的中国首富是广东省南部一个贫农的女儿，她的家庭因为在农村收购大面积的土地使用权和各种问题资产而变得富裕起来。1990年代初期，当地还没有房地产业。1990年代中期，中国的中产阶级正在兴起，她的父亲开发了这批人消费得起的联排别墅和度假屋。其他的农民企业家没有进入前十名，但是他们的成功故事也同样惊人。1980年代初期，从公社制度解放出来后，农民企业家离开他们的村子，到大城市兴建餐厅、洗衣店和小作坊。据温州的一位企业家所说，他们的亲朋好友也纷纷效仿，他说：”我的邻居在上海开了一家小型洗衣店，赚了不少钱。我的几个兄弟和我一起向亲戚朋友借了8万元，加上我们自己家的2万1千元存款，我们在1995年也去了上海，我们发现那里已经有许多类似的商店。因此，我们开了干洗店。“像其他地方的企业家一样，中国的私营企业家通过获得三种人（朋友、家人以及笨蛋）的资助来建立自己的企业。
Corruption served as an unexpected weapon of entrepreneurs, without which they could not have navigated the narrow channel separating success from prison. Entrepreneurs had to “wear a red hat” (register a family business as a part of a formal legal organization), set up their businesses as sham collective enterprises, or find “big shots” or “mothers-in-law” to serve as patrons to give them protection. Without such cover, they could not issue receipts, keep books, pay taxes, write contracts, or open bank accounts. Many rural private businesses could not have survived the tax burden on private companies without such devices. Two farmers in a village of Fujian Province set up a packaging factory. Everyone in the village knew that the factory belonged to them but the factory was officially a village collective. By using the collective’s name, the private village factory paid lower taxes and even received low-interest loans. After paying 5,000 Yuan in "management fees” to the village head and another 1,000 to the township government, the village factory went about its business unhampered.
出乎意料的是，贪污腐败成了企业家的秘密武器，非此就无法铤而走险获得成功。企业家必须”戴着红帽子“（将家族生意注册为某个正式合法机构的一部分），把他们的商业伪装成集体企业，或者找到某些”大人物“做赞助人以受其保护。没有这样的保护层，他们不可能开收据、记账、纳税、订合同或开设银行账户。没有这样的装备，许多农村私营企业不可能负担得起私营企业税。福建省一个农村里的两个农民建了一家包装工厂，那个村的所有人都知道这家工厂属于他们俩，但其工商注册时用的却是农村集体企业。通过使用集体企业的名义，这家私营的农村工厂可以纳更少的税，甚至可以得到低利率的贷款。给村长付了5千元并给镇政府付了1000元的”管理费“之后，这家乡村工厂就得以进行无碍营业了。
The success of China’s entrepreneurs in creating the institutions of private markets is told by some remarkable statistics. In 1978, state enterprises generated about 80 percent of China’s gdp, while the rural commune produced the other 20 percent. There were no private businesses. By 1997, there were 961,000 private enterprises and 28.5 million small family private firms. By 2002, the nonstate sector’s share exceeded two-thirds of gdp, with the share produced by truly private companies comprising more than half. By 2004, there were more than three million private companies employing more than 47 million workers. Before 1980, entrepreneurial activity in China was illegal. Today, there are over 40 million entrepreneurs, whose businesses employ over 200 million and generate two-thirds of industrial output. The state had no choice but to accept the reality of burgeoning farmers’ markets and private trade. The improvement in product quality and the disappearance of long food lines convinced urban residents, as well as government leaders, of the power of grassroots entrepreneurial activities. The state could not curtail such activities without inflaming the entire populace, although it periodically tried. In 1988, the government made it theoretically legal to own private businesses but in practice imposed strict controls over private urban markets, including steep fees to regulate them.
中国企业家在创建私营市场体系中取得的成功，可以从一些显著的数据中窥见一斑。在1978年，中国的国营企业创造了约80%的中国国内生产总值（GDP），而农村公社创造了余下的20%，那个时候中国没有私营企业。截至1997年，共有96.1万家私营企业和2850万家小型家族私有公司。截至2002年，非国营企业的国内生产总值份额已经超过三分之二，包括由真正的私营企业所创造的一半多的份额。截至2004年，私营企业超过300万家，雇员超过4700万人。在1980年以前，企业经营活动在中国是非法的。现在，有超过4千万个企业家，他们的企业一共雇用了逾2亿的工人，产生了三分之二的工业产值。国家别无他法，唯有接受增长迅速的农民市场与私营交易这个现实。产品质量有所提高，食物也不再短缺，这些现象令城市居民与政府领导都认可了草根层面的企业活动。国家不能在不激怒全体民众的情况下缩减这种企业活动，尽管它断断续续地试过缩减的可能。在1988年，政府使拥有私营企业在理论上合法化，但是实际上却严格控制农村私营市场，包括以不合理的收费对其进行管制。
Private business originated in agriculture, spread to the cities, and then returned to the countryside as rural-based industry. Many large private manufacturing firms developed in predominantly agricultural provinces (Zhejiang, Shandong, Guangdong, Hunan, and Sichuan). China’s largest agribusiness, the Hoep Group, was founded by the Liu brothers, who left the city to found their company in a rural part of Sichuan province. Wang Guoduan, a rural entrepreneur from southern Guangdong province, built the largest refrigerator maker, Kelon Group; Huanyuan, China’s largest air conditioner maker, is based in the agricultural province of Hunan. China’s first automobile exports will likely come “from the agricultural hinterland of Anhui province, where Chery is located.” Rural Wenzhou entrepreneurs provide capital and consumer goods to the cities, and their private capital financed its airports and highways.
私营企业从农业开始起步，渐渐蔓延到城市，再回到乡镇，变成基于农村的企业。许多大型私有制造业厂商都起步于农业大省（浙江，山东，广东，湖南和四川）。中国最大的农企新希望集团，是刘氏兄弟离开了城市在四川省农村创办的。王国端作为来自广东省南部的农民企业家，创立了最大的冰箱制造企业——科龙集团。中国最大的空调制造商Huanyuan，扎根在农业大省湖南。中国最早的汽车专家很可能来自“奇瑞公司的所在地，即安徽省的偏远农村”。温州的农民企业家，为城市提供了生产资料与日常消费品，并以他们的私人资本资助了当地的机场和高速公路的建设。
Globalization and fdi
全球化和外商投资
Let us now turn to the two countries’ quite different experiences with respect to international trade. Both China and Russia began from the same starting point. Each had a strict system of centralized controls exercised by a foreign trade monopoly. Both Mao and Stalin believed in self-reliance and were reluctant to depend on other countries. Soviet Russia had carved out a trading bloc of communist states in Eastern Europe, which limited reliance on the West. Both countries missed out on the huge postwar expansion of trade as they turned inward.
让我们来看看两国对国际贸易截然不同的态度。中国和俄罗斯曾处于同一起点。二者的国际贸易都被高度集权的中央系统所垄断。毛泽东和斯大林都信奉独立自主与自力更生，且不愿依赖他国。苏俄在东欧构建了一个社会主义国家贸易集团，其减少了对西方国家的依赖。两国在重视国内发展的同时，都错过了战后迅速膨胀的国际贸易。
China’s success in attracting foreign capital and know-how and selling manufactured products in foreign markets is well documented, and the steady hand of Deng Xiaoping and his successors in promoting Chinese globalization cannot be denied. Opening an economy to world markets is not something that can be done from below. China’s leaders were not without a model. They could not but notice the remarkable transformations of the nearby Four Tigers of Southeast Asia. China’s entry into the global marketplace dates to 1980, when the first free trade zones were established, bordering Hong Kong territory. The rest is history. In 1978, China’s trade accounted for less than 1 percent of the world economy. China is now the world’s third-largest trading nation with 6 percent of world trade. China’s economy is more dependent on trade than even Japan’s and South Korea’s.
有文献表明，中国在引入外资和技术，并将工业品销售到国外市场方面已经取得成功，同时，邓小平的坚定领导及其继任者们的不懈努力所取得的改革开放的成功也同样不容忽视。向世界市场开放不能自下而上实现。中国的领导人并不是没有范例可循：眼前就有亚洲四小龙（韩国、台湾、新加坡、香港）的奇迹崛起。中国的改革开放始于1980年，毗邻香港建立了第一批自由贸易区（深圳、珠海、汕头与福建厦门四个对外经济特区）。据史料记载，1978年，中国的贸易额不足世界经济的1%。现在，中国却是占世界贸易额6%的第三大贸易国。中国的经济甚至比韩国、日本更依赖于贸易。
Gorbachev could not help but be impressed by China’s successes in international markets. The globalization of the Russian economy was to serve as a centerpiece of his reform program. Gorbachev’s January 1987 joint venture law (accompanied by proposals for free trade zones) mimicked the Chinese laws of a few years earlier and for good reason. By the time he took office, China was attracting the largest amount of foreign direct investment of any emerging market country. Gorbachev hoped that opening Russia would make reform painless. In his first years in office, he anticipated an “acceleration” of output based upon the utilization of new technologies largely acquired from Western partners.
戈尔巴乔夫也禁不住被中国在世界市场上的成功深深震撼。俄罗斯经济的全球化也成了他的改革主题。戈氏在1987年1月发布的《合资企业法》（和自由贸易区提案一并发布），意图模仿中国在数年前的相关法规。当他掌权的时候，中国吸引的外资是所有新兴市场中最多的。戈氏希望开放俄罗斯能让改革更顺利。在他执政的头几年，他希望利用从西方伙伴处购入的大量新技术为俄罗斯的工业生产带来“腾飞”。
Both China and Russia had a common communist past and both had abundant human resources. Russia was initially better off because of its trained scientists and engineers. Gorbachev threw open the doors to Russia but no one came, contrary to the Chinese experience. This puzzle is easily explained, but it makes the Chinese success even more intriguing.
中国和俄罗斯都曾有共产主义的背景，并且都拥有大量人力资源。俄罗斯一开始很富裕，归功于它有大量训练有素的科学家和工程师。戈尔巴乔夫向世界敞开俄罗斯大门，但是没人进来，与中国人的经历相反。其中的原因虽不难解释，却使得人们对中国的成功更加好奇。
Why did Russia fail in attracting foreign direct investment? Western investors had to cast a dubious eye on investments in Russia. Only a few Russians had experience in world markets, and they had all worked for the foreign trade monopoly. There was no one who could credibly explain to foreign business what would happen if contracts were violated, how investments could be secured in the absence of private property laws, or how these investments were to be integrated into what was still a planned economy. Western concerns were being asked to make huge infrastructure investments in energy in the absence of any law on subsoil resources. There was simply no credible intermediary to stand between Russia’s desire for foreign investment and the willingness of the West to risk its capital in Russia.
为什么俄罗斯在吸引外资方面遭遇失败呢？因为西方的投资者在投资俄罗斯方面不得不持怀疑态度。只有一部分俄罗斯人在国际贸易方面有经验，他们也都独占了对外贸易工作。没人向外国投资者做出令人信服的解释---如果违约怎么办，在缺乏私有财产法律保护之下的资金安全何在，以及投资要如何合并到计划经济体制中。西方投资者们担忧，国家基本资源相关法律的缺失会使他们在基础设施方面的巨额投资会打水漂。简单来说，在俄罗斯对外资的渴望和西方投资者对俄罗斯的投资意愿之间缺乏可信赖的媒介。
Russia lacked a Russian Diaspora. A few Russians had emigrated to the United States and Israel. But China had a “Greater China” that numbered in the millions of Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, Southeast Asia, and North America. These “Greater Chinese,” especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan, still had roots on the mainland. They had demonstrated their business acumen, and they understood the potential of a low-wage country with abundant human resources strategically situated in the heart of booming Southeast Asia. These Greater Chinese intermediaries could explain to investors how to invest and with whom. Who could be trusted? Who could not? Which government officials are reliable? Equally important, these intermediaries were successful and had business and property outside of China that could be used as collateral for doubting foreign investors.
俄罗斯缺乏海外移民。只有少数俄罗斯人移居到美国和以色列。但是中国有个“大中华”，有数百万的华人在香港、台湾、澳门、东南亚和北美地区生活。这些华人，特别是香港和台湾人，依然扎根在中国大陆。同时，他们不仅在商业上成就卓越，而且也懂得中国地处蓬勃发展的东南亚中心，并具有丰富廉价人力资源，因而有着巨大潜力。这些华人可以当做外资的媒介，向投资者介绍如何进行投资、与谁进行投资。谁能被信任，谁不能，哪个政府部门是可信赖的。同样地，这些中介人又是成功的企业家，在中国海外拥有大量的资产，可以向有疑心的外国投资者用作担保。
The largest number of overseas Chinese, most of whom were refugees from China, resided in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and China’s first lesson in global exchange was from nearby Hong Kong. Before communist rule, the inhabitants of the capital of Guangdong (adjacent to Hong Kong), were considered city slickers, while Hong Kong was full of country bumpkins. As Hong Kong surged, several million Guangdongese escaped to Hong Kong, where they participated in its economic miracle. Friends and families lined up in long queues in Guangzhou to receive hand-me-downs from their Hong Kong friends and relatives. Young urban women wanted to marry only men with overseas family relations. When the Chinese government first set up Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen (near Hong Kong), Zhuhai (near Macau), Shantou (the hometown of Hong Kong refugees), and Xiemen (near Taiwan), the Chinese borrowed their new rules and regulations directly from Hong Kong. Guangdong entrepreneurs copied the Hong Kong model of “Front Shop, Back Factory,” while others set up joint factories together with Hong Kong small business owners. Using family and cultural ties, Hong Kong cousins were able to overcome red tape. Hong Kong business tycoon Gordon Wu (a Princeton graduate) built the first toll expressway linking Guangzhou to Hong Kong by promising to cede it to the Chinese government after 15 years. Hong Kong, with the largest container port in Asia, provided both hard and soft infrastructure for China. It was through Hong Kong that Chinese goods first reached global markets. Taiwanese investors began to flood into China in the early 1990s, circumventing a ban on business with China by going through Hong Kong. They used China for manufacturing bases to contend with increasing world competition. By 2004, Taiwanese investment comprised close to three percent of China’s gdp. In 2001, the Chinese state itself took a giant step towards further globalization by becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (wto). wto membership gave China incentives to be a responsible global trade partner.
海外华人数量众多，以曾是大陆难民而今定居在香港和台湾的居多，中国全球交易的第一堂课就是从最近的香港开始的。在共产党执政之前，广东省省会（毗邻香港）的居民被认为是时髦的城市人，而香港全是乡巴佬。当香港快速发展的时候，数百万广东人逃往香港并参与了香港的经济奇迹。亲友们在广州排起长队从香港亲属手中接受旧衣物。年轻的城市女性也只想嫁给有海外亲戚的男人。当中国政府在深圳（靠近香港）、珠海（毗邻澳门）、汕头（香港难民的原住地）与厦门（靠近台湾）设立了第一批对外经济特区，中国人从香港直接拿来了现成的制度和规则。广东的企业家也成功复制香港的“前店后厂”模式，也有不少人和香港小型企业主合办工厂。利用家族和文化纽带，香港企业家得以成功摆脱官僚的繁文缛节。香港商界大亨胡应湘（普林斯顿大学毕业）在香港和广东之间建设了一条高速公路，并承诺15年后交付中国政府。香港，以亚洲最大的货柜港口，为中国的国际贸易提供了软件和硬件方面的基础设施。正是通过香港，中国的货物第一次延伸至世界市场。通过香港，台湾投资人成功规避了与中国大陆进行直接交易的商业禁令，他们在1990年代初期也开始涌向中国大陆。截至2004年，台湾投资接近中国GDP的3%。在2001年，中国自身迈出了深化其全球化的重要一步——加入世界贸易组织(WTO)。同时，WTO成员资格也激励中国成为一名负责的全球贸易伙伴。
State-owned enterprises
国营企业
Gorbachev inherited an economy in which virtually the entire citizenry worked for the state. State-owned enterprises (soes) dominated industry, trade, and even agriculture. The notorious collective farms had been de facto converted to state farms. In China, the majority of citizens did not work for the state when Deng Xiaoping took over. They worked instead for collective farms, which had to meet delivery quotas. If things went bad, there was no state bailout. They were on their own. In Soviet Russia, proposals for reforming soes had been floated since the early 1960s. In Mao’s China, the “word ‘reform’ wasn’t even in the vocabulary of state leaders.” Despite these different backgrounds, Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping devised very similar reforms of soes with similarly poor results. Gorbachev incorporated earlier reform ideas in his Law on Enterprises of July 1987. Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang initiated an urban contract responsibility in 1984 based on the success of rural reform, as Deng Xiaoping decided “to apply the rural experience to urban economic system reforms.”
在戈尔巴乔夫继承的经济体中，几乎所有公民都为国家工作。国有企业统治了工业、贸易，甚至农业。臭名昭著的集体农场实际已经变成了国有农场。而在中国，邓小平上任后，大多数公民不再为国家工作，转而为集体农场工作，那里曾经实行定额分配。如果经营不善，国家不会提供援助，他们必须自负盈亏。苏联在20世纪60年代初就已经提出改革国企的建议。而在毛时代的中国，国家领导人的字典里甚至没有‘改革’一词。尽管有不同的背景，但是，戈尔巴乔夫和邓小平设计出了非常相似的国企改革方案，结果也都差不多一样糟。1987年，戈尔巴乔夫在他制定的《企业法》中把较早时改革的想法具体化。邓小平则在农村成功改革的基础之上，开始实施城市的承包责任制改革，邓小平决定“把农村的成功经验运用到城市经济体制的改革当中。”
In both countries, soes formed the core of the planned “commanding heights” of heavy industry, defense, transportation, and finance. They could not be turned over to private owners without destroying both the planning system and the socialist foundation of society. Insofar as soe production was integrated into a national plan, they could not be allowed to fail. Instead, they operated under “soft budgets” under which their losses were automatically covered. They were managed by powerful ministries, regional officials, and party leaders; they employed millions of relatively pampered workers who depended upon them for wages and benefits. All of these formed a powerful interest group against meaningful reform, or to turn reform perversely in their favor. Gorbachev had no choice but to address the problem of soes from day one of his reforms. China’s leaders could afford to postpone dealing with their soes.
在两个国家中，国企都是计划经济的核心，是重工业、国防、交通运输和国防的“制高点”。国企不能交与私人所有，否则便会摧毁计划体制和社会的社会主义基础。由于国企生产被统一到国家计划中，所以国企不允许破产。国企是在“软预算”下经营的，在这种制度下，国企的亏损会被自动填补上。国企由权力部门、地方政府和党政领导来管理；国企雇用的上百万职工相对来说娇生惯养，依赖工资和福利过活。所有这些构成了一个强大的利益集团，他们反对有意义的改革，或为了自身利益，顽固地在改革上走回头路。戈尔巴乔夫从他发起改革的那一天起，就必须应对国企问题。而中国的领导人们则有足够的时间，可以延缓处理国企问题。
Gorbachev inherited an economy in which virtually the entire citizenry worked for the state.
戈尔巴乔夫继承的经济体，是一个几乎全民都在为国家工作的经济体。
In both cases, the remedy applied was to reduce the tutelage over soes, give them more decision-making authority, and provide incentives to operate their enterprises more efficiently. In spite of their different settings and backgrounds, both reforms did the same things: soes were still required to deliver planned outputs to the planning system but they could keep above-plan output, which they could sell at higher prices. Managers and employees could retain more profits for bonuses and investment. They could increasingly buy inputs and sell outputs through “direct links” with other soes. In both cases, planners fixed the prices of goods that went through the planning system, which were exchanged among soes. Thus, the same product (say, steel) could be bought and sold at two or more prices, the lowest one being the state official price.
在两国的改革案例中，使用的补救办法都是减少对国企的监护，给予它们更多的决策权，并提出使国企经营更有效率的激励方案。尽管两国的环境和情况不同，但他们都在改革中作了同样的事情：国家要求国企仍然需要为计划体系完成已计划的产量，但是，允许国企保留计划外的产量，并以更高的价格出售。无论是管理者，还是雇员，都可以保留更多的利润作为奖金和投资。国企可通过同其它国企“直接连系”逐渐增加投入和销售量。两国的案例中，计划者通过计划体系为产品定价。国企之间通过这套计划体系来交易。因此，同样的产品（例如，钢材）在买卖时可能会有两个或两个以上的价格，其中最低的价格即为政府定价。
Unwittingly, both Russia’s and China’s soe reforms created a “perfect rent generating machine.” In both countries, managers set up small businesses and cooperatives within their factories, which they used to strip state assets. They diverted production from the planned to the cooperative sector where they could sell at higher prices. Easy profits were made by buying inputs (often from oneself) at fixed state prices, diverting them to cooperative production, and then selling at much higher prices.
不知不觉中，俄罗斯与中国的国企改革都造就了“完美的自动贷款机”。在两个国家中，管理者都会在他们的工厂内建立小公司和集体企业，用以剥离国有资产。国企的管理者们把计划内的产品转移到集体企业，可以卖更高的价格。因为可以把以国家固定价格购买的生产投入品转移到集体企业，然后以更高的价格卖出，所以（常常是自己买自己的）很容易获取利润。
The remedy to such blatant rent-seeking and corruption in both countries was a tough bankruptcy law. Gorbachev’s 1987 enterprise law actually required soes to cover their costs; there were to be no bailouts, supposedly. But there were no bankruptcies. Unprofitable state enterprises argued that closing them would put restive workers on the streets and would deprive the state of essential production. Bailouts continued unabated. In 1986, the Chinese government under Zhao Zhiyang and Deng Xiaoping introduced a bankruptcy law, which mobilized vested interests to remove reform-minded leaders like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zhiyang (both party secretaries). When the state again started to force bankruptcies in 1998 and 1999, local government officials sold assets (mostly for real estate) to rapacious ex-officials and politically linked private companies for their own use.
为了杜绝如此无耻的寻租和腐败行为，两国都颁布了严厉的破产法。戈尔巴乔夫1987年公布的企业法要求国企控制自身成本；原则上不再提供救助。但实际上，没有国企因此而破产。亏损的国有企业狡辩称，关闭企业它将把焦躁的工人们推到大街上，丧失基本的生产活动。于是，对国企的救助依然不减。1986年，中国政府颁布了破产法。1998年和1999年国家重新强令破产时，地方政府把资产（大部分是地产）卖给贪婪的前政府官员和与自己集团挂钩的私人企业，从而中饱私囊。
The failure of the enterprise law produced catastrophic results in Russia. Planned production collapsed, soes refused to supply each other, and the planned economy ceased to function for all practical purposes. Unlike in China, where hardliners still had the power to undermine reform, Gorbachev retained the power to push his reform through. He even went so far as to break up the party bureaus that oversaw the economy, prompting an abortive coup by hardliners. In December of 1991, the ussr split up into 15 separate republics that began their own independent reforms.
企业破产法的失败在俄罗斯产生了灾难性的结果。计划生产倒塌了，国企与国企彼此之间拒绝供货，计划经济失去了所有实际功能。在中国，强硬派仍有能力暗中破坏改革，俄罗斯则不同，戈尔巴乔夫还有权力推动改革。他甚至解散了负责监管计划经济的苏共机构，导致强硬派发动了政变。1991年12月，苏联解体为15个单独的共和国，开始了自己的独立改革。
China’s SOEs continued to operate inefficiently and corruptly, but they did not cause China’s economy to collapse.
中国国企的经营依旧没有效率、腐败丛生，但并没有引起中国经济的崩溃。
China’s soes continued to operate inefficiently and corruptly, but they did not cause China’s economy to collapse as they did Russia’s. Technically insolvent soes continue to be bailed out. Although the state sector currently accounts for a third of gdp, more than 70 percent of state bank loans go to soes. Despite their decreasing share of the economy, soes continue to control most natural resources, including land, mineral deposits, forest, and water resources. They are a major source of corruption. According to one estimate, rent seeking and official profiteering take between 20 and 30 percent of China’s gdp.
中国国企的经营依旧低效而腐败，但未像俄罗斯一样引起中国经济的崩溃。严格来说，负债累累的国企仍在接受救助。尽管目前国企只占国内生产总值的三分之一，却得到国有银行超过70%的贷款。尽管减少了在经济中所占的比重，但是国企仍然控制着包括土地、矿藏、森林和水在内的大部分自然资源。国企是腐败的主要来源。有评估称，寻租和官倒占中国国内生产总值的20%到30%。
How can China thrive with such inefficient and corrupt soes? China’s fabled growth is the combination of the high growth of agriculture, private business, and international companies with the slower growth of the state sector. Moreover, China’s soes are probably not as inefficient. In Russia, there were no benchmarks for soes. In China, soes coexist with joint ventures and foreign banks, and they face competition from private businesses encroaching on their markets. Joint ventures provide yardsticks to measure soe performance. In 2006, labor productivity in foreign-invested enterprise was nine times that of other companies (primarily soes).
存在如此低效和腐败的国企，中国如何走向繁荣？中国的增长神话是农业、私人企业，以及国际公司的高速增长与国企较慢增长结合的产物。此外，中国的国企可能也不是那么没有效率。俄罗斯的国企没有参照物。而中国的国企是与合资企业和国外银行并存的，他们要面对来自私人企业抢占市场的竞争。合资企业提供了衡量国企业绩表现的标准。2006年，外资企业的劳动生产率是其它企业（主要是国企）的9倍。
The strength of the rest of the economy has given China’s leadership breathing room to experiment with remedies, such as restructuring SOEs into conglomerates (something Gorbachev tried without success), setting up shareholding companies, and creating stock markets in Shenzhen and Shanghai to raise capital for key state factories. The soe problem is also solving itself through attrition. The number of soes fell from 118,000 in 1995 to 27,477 in 2005. Since 1996, soe employment declined by 44 million jobs, more than half of which were in manufacturing. Part of this attrition is simply due to corruption as managers “spontaneously privatized” soes by diverting their assets into their own pockets.
非国有经济体带来的力量给了中国领导人喘息的空间，从而能够进行治疗的实验，例如把国企重组成集团企业（戈尔巴乔夫做过尝试，但失败了），成立股份制公司，并在深圳和上海创办股市，以便为主要国有工厂筹集资金。国企还正在通过精兵简政来解决自身的问题。国企数量从1995年的11.8万家减少的2005年的27477家。自1996年以来，国企员工数减少了4400万，其中超过一半属于制造业。部分原因是管理者们把国企资产转移到自己的腰包，实现了“自发的私有化”。
Lessons for the present
以古鉴今
China and russia in the 1980s offer a unique case study in why some reforms work and others do not. The contrast refutes the notion that a strong, perhaps totalitarian state, is required for successful reform. In the Russian case, a one-party state attempted to impose reform from above and failed. In China, a one-party state opened the economy but resisted grassroots reforms, which it grudgingly accepted after their success could no longer be denied. For decades, a small group of Russian liberals lobbied in vain for reform. They finally got their chance when a reform-minded party leader was elected, but there was no real constituency for reform. In China, there was a massive grassroots constituency which clearly understood reform’s potential benefits. They acted quietly on their own, according to the Chinese saying, “Do more but say less; do everything but say nothing.” The Chinese rural population, as outsiders, had nothing to lose. With more than 80 percent of Chinese people pushing for change, reform could not help but penetrate the social and economic psychology of the Chinese mind.
20世纪80年代，中国和俄罗斯在为什么某些改革可以成功而某些改革不能成功这个问题上提供了一个独特的案例。两国改革的对比驳斥了一个根深蒂固的概念，那就是极权主义国家或许可以成功改革。俄罗斯的案例中，一党专制的政府试图通过上级强制性改革，最后却失败。中国，一党专政开放了经济却抵制基层改革，直到基层改革的成功成为既成事实之后，政府才很不情愿地接受了它。数十年来，俄罗斯某些人游说改革，却无功而返。最后在一个有改革思想的政府出现时，他们才看到了希望。但是对于改革，并没有忠实的支持者。中国拥有一大批基层支持者，他们很清楚改革潜在的利益。他们暗自行动，中国有句俗话：少说话多做事。作为无法获胜的人，中国农民早已一无所有，没什么可以担心失去的了。80%多的中国人推动变革。改革不会帮助人，但却非常迎合中国人的社会和经济心理。
Bottom-up reform cannot be resisted because it requires no negotiations, avoids confrontations, and it spreads like an unstoppable plague. Top-down reform can be killed easily by ridding the leadership of reformers or by high-level sabotage. Chinese-style reform was made possible by special circumstances — the tradition of small private agriculture and trading, the recent catastrophes and purges, and China’s backwardness as an agricultural economy. If Chinese leaders had faced the same circumstances as Gorbachev, they would have failed as miserably. Gorbachev had to confront the insoluble problems of large state industrial enterprises; the Chinese could afford to wait and watch them shrink in relative size.
无法抵制自下而上的改革，因为这是无可非议的，且没有冲突，像无法控制的瘟疫一样肆意传播。自上而下的改革很容易会因改革者领导权取消或高层破坏而被扼杀，中国式改革或许只能在特殊环境中形成——小型私人农贸的传统、近期发生大灾难和肃清异己活动，以及作为农业经济体的落后状态。如果中国领导人面临像戈尔巴乔夫这样的处境，他们可能会不幸失败。戈尔巴乔夫不得不面对大型国有工业企业无法解决的问题；而中国则可以等待，可以坐视国企规模缩减到合适规模。
Each country’s present is affected by its past. In both cases, their initial reforms began more than a quarter century ago. China’s leaders subsequently did not change course: Each new party leader honored the policies of his predecessor. In Russia, the Soviet Communist Party was disbanded. There was a burst of democracy and market economy under Yeltsin, followed by a retreat on both fronts under Putin. Russia is now ruled by a duumvirate, one of whom has a kgb background and who reinstated a form of totalitarian rule.
两个国家如今的面貌都受其历史的影响。在这两个例子中，它们最初的改革可以追溯到25年前。中国领导人后来并没有改变道路方向：每一个新的领导人都很尊重他前任领导人的政策。在俄罗斯，苏联共产党解体。叶利钦(Yeltsin)领导下，民主制和市场经济兴起，之后普京在这两方面都表示让步。如今俄罗斯由两个政党领导，一个有着克格勃背景，一个主张恢复极权统治模式。
The paths of China and Russia continue to diverge: China’s communist leaders watch the state-controlled commanding heights shrink. China’s entrepreneurs have built, against all odds, private manufacturing. Large state companies cannot compete against private domestic or foreign companies. They are kept alive by state subsidies and preferences, but there may come a day when this is no longer the case. Russia’s corporate giants are direct descendants from Soviet enterprises; none have been built from the ground up. They were privatized to urban, politically connected insiders under Yeltsin. Most stripped assets, but some began to create shareholder value after then-President Vladimir Putin promised them secure property rights. In a fateful reversal, Putin concluded that the commanding heights belonged to the state, and Russia’s large companies were renationalized. Those that remain in private hands do so with the understanding that they serve state interests, not those of shareholders.
中国和俄罗斯的道路仍有分歧：中国共产主义领导人坐视政府统治的制高点减少。中国的企业家不顾一切，建立私有企业。大型国有企业无法与国内私有企业或外资企业竞争。他们主要靠国家补助和优惠存活，但是这终究不是办法。俄罗斯如今的大公司都是苏维埃企业的后裔，没有一家是在苏联解体以后成立。这些公司在叶利钦任期内都经过私有化以移交给有政治背景的内部人士。总统弗拉基米尔·普京保证会保护大部分剥离资产的产权，但是有些资产在之后也开始创造股东价值。这是个决定命运的逆转，普京总结说制高点属于国家，俄罗斯大型企业重新收归国有。那些之所以留存在私人手上的企业是因为他们为国家而非股东创造财富。
Each country seems to have learned the wrong lesson from the other — China that political reform will destroy the Communist Party and Russia that only a strong authoritarian leader can make reform succeed. China’s ruling party continues to resist political change. Putin and Medvedev continue to strengthen authoritarian control.
似乎每个国家都曾从他国学习过错误的经验——中国的“政治改革会破坏党内和谐的理论”及俄罗斯“强权独裁的领导人才能引导改革胜利”的理论。中国的执政党持续抵制政治变革。普京和梅德韦杰夫则继续加强专制控制。
Both Russia’s and China’s histories reveal that politically-operated and state-owned enterprises cannot compete. Russia’s current leaders are compounding their problems as they take control of more and more of the industrial economy. These new Russian soes face little or no competition. Russia’s new leaders have driven out foreign ventures, and private entrepreneurs would face physical danger if they encroached on their markets. It’s likely that Russia’s giants — Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosneft, and the like — will become even more inefficient and operate for political rather than economic gain.
中俄两国的历史都揭露了一点：由政治主导和国家控制的企业是没有竞争力的。由于俄罗斯当前的领导层对工业经济控制的加深，国家问题越来越严重。俄罗斯的这些新国有企业所面临的竞争很少，或是没有竞争。俄罗斯的新领导层将外资企业赶出国门，而私营企业家一旦踏足国有企业的市场，将受到人身伤害的威胁。俄罗斯的巨头企业们(俄罗斯天然气工业公司，卢克石油公司，俄罗斯石油公司等可能会经营效率越来越低，逐渐变成政治主导而非经济收益主导型企业。
China’s leaders face an interesting dilemma, the resolution of which will affect their future. Starting in 2001, the Communist party began to co-opt business leaders into the party-state network. As members of the party-state elite, China’s entrepreneurs gained the opportunity to earn profits by using connections rather than entrepreneurship. In 2007, the party and state passed China’s first property law, which legalized private property. How this law will be enforced remains to be seen, but it represents a key step towards creating a rule of law in place of political arbitrariness. China’s entrepreneurs face a choice: Will they compete as entrepreneurs in the even playing field of a rule of law, or will they become like party apparatchiks, using their party status to gain “unearned” profits? If they choose the latter, they will kill the competitive goose that lays the golden eggs. The result could be a China that falls into a stagnant oligarchy like that of Russia. Napoleon once said, “Let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.” It depends which China will awake — a nation of entrepreneurs or oligarchic party officials.
中国的领导人面临的是一个有趣的困境，这一困境的解决与否，解决的如何将直接影响中国的未来。2001年以来，中国共产党开始发展企业领导人壮大党国成员的队伍。作为党国的精英成员，中国的企业家通过关系网而非企业家精神获取收益。2007年，党和国家通过了中国的第一部物权法，承认私有财产的合法化。这项法律的效应大家拭目以待，但是，它却是立法代替政治独裁的关键一步。中国的企业家们面临这样的抉择：是选择在一个公平立法的环境中竞争；还是被同化改造，利用其党政地位去获取那些“不劳而获”的利益？如果他们选择后者，无疑他们会扼杀一只产金蛋的鹅（创造财富的竞争体制）。结果可能导致中国沦为像俄罗斯那样的经济停滞不前的寡头政治。拿破仑曾经说过：“让中国沉睡吧，一旦她醒了，她将震撼整个世界。”关键在于中国唤醒的是什么——是一个由企业化竞争机制占主导的国家，还是一个寡头政治专制的国家。
Paul Gregory is the Cullen Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of Houston and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Kate Zhou is Professor of Chinese Political Economy and Comparative Politics at the University of Hawaii. She is the author of How the Farmers Changed China (Westview, 1996) and China’s Long March to Freedom, Grassroots Modernization (Transaction, 2009).
保罗·格雷戈里是休斯敦大学的卡伦特聘教授，美国斯坦福大学胡弗研究所的研究员。凯特·周是夏威夷大学中国政治经济学和比较政治学的教授。她著有《农民如何改变中国》（韦斯特维尤，1996年）及《中国通往自由、基层现代化的漫漫征程》（交易，2009）
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