网络战——来自互联网的威胁编辑本段回目录
THROUGHOUT history new technologies have revolutionised warfare, sometimes abruptly, sometimes only gradually: think of the chariot, gunpowder, aircraft, radar and nuclear fission. So it has been with information technology. Computers and the internet have transformed economies and given Western armies great advantages, such as the ability to send remotely piloted aircraft across the world to gather intelligence and attack targets. But the spread of digital technology comes at a cost: it exposes armies and societies to digital attack.
纵观历史，新技术往往引发战争革命，有时突然，有时渐进：想想战车、火药、飞机、雷达和核裂变技术的出现，哪次没有使战争形态产生翻天覆地的变化？信息技术也是如此，计算机和互联网已转变了经济模式并给西方军队带来巨大优势。例如，他们有能力派遣遥控飞机在世界各地收集情报和打击目标。但电子技术的广泛应用也要付出代价：它使军队和社会都暴露于电子攻击之下。
The threat is complex, multifaceted and potentially very dangerous. Modern societies are ever more reliant on computer systems linked to the internet, giving enemies more avenues of attack. If power stations, refineries, banks and air-traffic-control systems were brought down, people would lose their lives. Yet there are few, if any, rules in cyberspace of the kind that govern behaviour, even warfare, in other domains. As with nuclear- and conventional-arms control, big countries should start talking about how to reduce the threat from cyberwar, the aim being to restrict attacks before it is too late.
这种威胁是复杂的，多方面的，甚至有可能非常危险。现代社会比以往任何时候都依赖于接入互联网的计算机系统，这给了敌人更多的攻击途径。如果发电站、炼油厂、银行和控制交通控制系统被拿下，人们的生活将无以为继。尽管如此，网络空间依然没有任何行为准则，甚或，在其它领域而言的话，战争守则。像对核武器和常规武器控制一样，大国应该抱着限制攻击，防患于未然的目的，开始讨论如何减小网络战争的威胁。
The army reboots
军队重启
Cyberspace has become the fifth domain of warfare, after land, sea, air and space (see article). Some scenarios imagine the almost instantaneous failure of the systems that keep the modern world turning. As computer networks collapse, factories and chemical plants explode, satellites spin out of control and the financial and power grids fail.
网络空间继陆、海、空、天（见：《第五维战场》）之后，成为了第五维战场。一些剧本描绘出维持现代世界运转的系统瞬间崩溃的景象。由于计算机网络崩塌，工厂和化工厂爆炸，卫星失去控制，金融系统和电网停止运转。
That seems alarmist to many experts. Yet most agree that infiltrating networks is pretty easy for those who have the will, means and the time to spare. Governments know this because they are such enthusiastic hackers themselves. Spies frequently break into computer systems to steal information by the warehouse load, whether it is from Google or defence contractors. Penetrating networks to damage them is not much harder. And, if you take enough care, nobody can prove you did it.
很多专家觉得那是危言耸听。然而，大多数都承认，对那些有意愿，有方法，有时间的人而言，网络渗透是相当容易的事。各国政府都清楚这一点，因为他们自己就是这类“热心”的黑客。间谍们经常侵入计算机系统，通过数据仓库装入来窃取情报（译者按：就是黑了你的电脑，把系统中的数据（比如你的文档、照片、视频之类的）拷贝一份传到间谍自己的电脑上），无论情报来自于google还是国防承包商。经由网络渗透来搞破坏也不算太难。而且，只要你够谨慎，没人能证明你做了这事儿（译者按：出来混总是要还的。不然你问问曾经攻入五角大楼的哥们儿些，看看他们现在在做什么工作。^_^）。
The cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008 (the latter strangely happened to coincide with the advance of Russian troops across the Caucasus) are widely assumed to have been directed by the Kremlin, but they could be traced only to Russian cyber-criminals. Many of the computers used in the attack belonged to innocent Americans whose PCs had been hijacked. Companies suspect China of organising mini-raids to ransack Western know-how: but it could just have easily been Western criminals, computer-hackers showing off or disillusioned former employees. One reason why Western governments have until recently been reticent about cyber-espionage is surely because they are dab hands at it, too.
2007年对爱沙尼亚和2008年对格鲁吉亚的网络攻击（对格鲁吉亚那次在时间上与俄罗斯向高加索派遣部队诡异地巧合啊）被广泛认为是有克里姆林宫策划的，但这些攻击之能被追踪到俄罗斯网络罪犯头上。很多被用于攻击的计算机都是个人电脑被劫持的无辜美国人的。有公司怀疑中国组织了小型网络攻击以洗劫西方技术：但也极有可能仅仅是西方的罪犯、爱现的黑客或者心怀不轨的前雇员干的。为什么西方政府此前一直对网络间谍行为保持缄默的其中一个原因，肯定是因为他们也掺了一脚进去。
As with nuclear bombs, the existence of cyber-weapons does not in itself mean they are about to be used. Moreover, an attacker cannot be sure what effect an assault will have on another country, making their deployment highly risky. That is a drawback for sophisticated military machines, but not necessarily for terrorists or the armies of rogue states. And it leaves the dangers of online crime and espionage.
网络武器和核炸弹一样，存在并不代表要使用。而且，攻击者不能确定攻击行为会对另一个国家造成怎样的影响，这就使得他们的攻击部署存在很高风险。对先进的军事力量（如美军）而言，这样的不确定性是网络攻击的一个缺陷，但恐怖分子和流氓国家的军队对此就无所谓了。网络攻击也带来了网上犯罪和间谍活动的危险。
All this makes for dangerous instability. Cyber-weapons are being developed secretly, without discussion of how and when they might be used. Nobody knows their true power, so countries must prepare for the worst. Anonymity adds to the risk that mistakes, misattribution and miscalculation will lead to military escalation—with conventional weapons or cyberarms. The speed with which electronic attacks could be launched gives little time for cool-headed reflection and favours early, even pre-emptive, attack. Even as computerised weapons systems and wired infantry have blown away some of the fog of war from the battlefield, they have covered cyberspace in a thick, menacing blanket of uncertainty.
所有这一切构成了危险的不稳定趋势。网络武器正被秘密研发，谁都不说将在何时，怎样使用他们。没人知道他们真正的力量，所以国家必须为最坏情况作打算。网络的匿名属性也增加了错误、错认和失算导致军事力量在常规武器或太空武器上升级的风险。电子战发动很快，且偏好先发制人的攻击方式，几乎没有时间留给你冷静应对。即使计算机辅助武器系统和信息化步兵（的公开）已经吹散了一些战场上的迷雾，网络武器依然给网络空间罩上了一层厚厚的危险的不确定性毯子。
One response to this growing threat has been military. Iran claims to have the world’s second-largest cyber-army. Russia, Israel and North Korea boast efforts of their own. America has set up its new Cyber Command both to defend its networks and devise attacks on its enemies. NATO is debating the extent to which it should count cyberwar as a form of “armed attack” that would oblige its members to come to the aid of an ally.
针对这一日益增长的威胁作出的一个反应是军事上的。伊朗宣称拥有世界第二大网军（译者按：绝对是吹的。你当欧洲是死人啊？）俄罗斯、以色列和北朝鲜吹嘘自己的努力。（译者按：俄罗斯黑客天才不少，以色列人的聪明也是众所周知了吧？北朝鲜太神秘，我们只能知道它‘宣称’出来的东西，实际情况真是两眼一抹黑啊。）美国已成立新的网络司令部用以防御自身网络和制订对敌攻击策略。北约正讨论网络战要达到何种程度才能被认定为是某种“武装攻击”的形式，从而责成其成员国提供作为盟友的帮助。
But the world needs cyberarms-control as well as cyber- deterrence. America has until recently resisted weapons treaties for cyberspace for fear that they could lead to rigid global regulation of the internet, undermining the dominance of American internet companies, stifling innovation and restricting the openness that underpins the net. Perhaps America also fears that its own cyberwar effort has the most to lose if its well-regarded cyberspies and cyber-warriors are reined in.
但是，世界需要网络军备控制和网络威慑。美国此前一直抵制网络武器协定，担心协定的达成会导致对互联网严格的全球监管。而严格监管会损害美国互联网公司的优势地位，压制创新，限制支撑互联网不断发展的开放性。也许美国还害怕，如果它倚重的网络间谍和网络战士被套上了缰绳，那它为网络战所做的努力将付之东流水了。
Such thinking at last shows signs of changing, and a good thing too. America, as the country most reliant on computers, is probably most vulnerable to cyber-attack. Its conventional military power means that foes will look for asymmetric lines of attack. And the wholesale loss of secrets through espionage risks eroding its economic and military lead.
这种抗拒协定的思维最终有了改变的迹象，也算是件好事。美国，作为最依赖计算机的国家，也是最容易遭受网络攻击的国家。它的常规军事力量意味着，其对手将剑走偏锋，寻求其它攻击途径。而大量通过间谍活动失窃的秘密也侵蚀了它的经济和军事霸主地位。
Hardware and soft war
硬件和软战争
If cyberarms-control is to America’s advantage, it would be wise to shape such accords while it still has the upper hand in cyberspace. General Keith Alexander, the four-star general who heads Cyber Command, is therefore right to welcome Russia’s longstanding calls for a treaty as a “starting point for international debate”. That said, a START-style treaty may prove impossible to negotiate. Nuclear warheads can be counted and missiles tracked. Cyber-weapons are more like biological agents; they can be made just about anywhere.
如果网络军备控制会给美国带来好处，那趁它在网络空间还掌握主动权的时候制订这些条款会比较明智。因此，作为”国际讨论的开端“，美国网络司令部指挥官，四星上将基斯·亚历山大（Keith Alexander译者按：此人履历蛮惊人的，学位一堆，职务一堆，有兴趣可以点击英文名字上的连接自己看看。）正打算接受俄罗斯长久以来对签署一份网络军备控制协议的要求。然而，一份起始性的协议可能只是证明：协商是不可能的。核弹头数量可以被计算得出，导弹可以被追踪。网络武器却更像生物制剂；他们可以在任何地方被制造。
So in the meantime countries should agree on more modest accords, or even just informal “rules of the road” that would raise the political cost of cyber-attacks. Perhaps there could be a deal to prevent the crude “denial-of-service” assaults that brought down Estonian and Georgian websites with a mass of bogus requests for information; NATO and the European Union could make it clear that attacks in cyberspace, as in the real world, will provoke a response; the UN or signatories of the Geneva Conventions could declare that cyber-attacks on civilian facilities are, like physical attacks with bomb and bullet, out of bounds in war; rich countries could exert economic pressure on states that do not adopt measures to fight online criminals. Countries should be encouraged to spell out their military policies in cyberspace, as America does for nuclear weapons, missile defence and space. And there could be an international centre to monitor cyber-attacks, or an international “duty to assist” countries under cyber-attack, regardless of the nationality or motive of the attacker—akin to the duty of ships to help mariners in distress.
所以，世界各国应于此际达成更适度的协定，甚或仅仅是非正式的“交通规则”，以增加网络攻击的政治成本。也许可以有一项条款用于防止粗鲁的“拒绝服务”攻击（译者按：大名鼎鼎的DoS（Denial of Service），对网络攻击稍有了解的人都知道。暴力攻击web网站的一种方法。不过，好像已经在硬件软件上都有办法防范了。），使爱沙尼亚和格鲁吉亚网站免遭被大量虚假信息请求淹没而崩溃的厄运。北约和欧盟可以明确表示，网络空间中的攻击行为和现实世界中的攻击一样会招致他们做出反应。联合国或日内瓦公约签署国可以声明对民用设施的网络攻击行为同使用炸弹和子弹攻击没什么两样，是违反战争公约的。富裕的国家可以对不采取措施打击网络犯罪的国家（译者按：真阴险，这不暗指中国吗？盗版问题……）施加经济压力。世界各国应当勇于说出自己在网络空间的军事策略，就像美国公开其核武器、导弹防御系统（译者按：著名的“星球大战计划”和“宙斯盾”听说过没？美国的被害妄想症还挺严重的。）和太空战的战略一样。还可以设立一个监测网络攻击行为的国际中心（译者按：已经有所谓民间研究性组织在干这事儿了，虽说还谈不上国际，至少人家的人员构成也囊括了西方几个大国嘛。至于其监测是全球性的广泛监测还是单单针对某几个国家的监测就说不准了。）或一份国际“援助义务”，为遭受网络攻击的国家提供帮助，不管攻击者的国籍和动机为何——就像船只有义务救援遇险海员一样。
The internet is not a “commons”, but a network of networks that are mostly privately owned. A lot could also be achieved by greater co-operation between governments and the private sector. But in the end more of the burden for ensuring that ordinary people’s computer systems are not co-opted by criminals or cyber-warriors will end up with the latter—especially the internet-service providers that run the network. They could take more responsibility for identifying infected computers and spotting attacks as they happen.
互联网不是“大锅饭”，而是由许多私有网络组成的大网。各国政府和私营企业间更紧密的合作可以实现很大成功。但最终，保证平民的计算机系统不受罪犯或网络战士利用的责任将更多地落在私营企业的身上——特别是运营网络的互联网服务提供商身上。他们应担负更多的识别受感染电脑和实时发现攻击行为的责任。
None of this will eradicate crime, espionage or wars in cyberspace. But it could make the world a little bit safer.
所有这一切都不能根除网络空间中的犯罪、间谍活动或网络战争。但可以使世界稍微更安全一点。
